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Gang Mt Agley
by Carl E. Schneider

The amount of law is relatively small
which a modern legis!dture can successfully
impose. The reason for this is that unless
the enforcement of the !dw is taken in
hand by the citizenry, the officials as such
are quite helpless. ... For what gives !dw
reality is not that it is commanded by the
sovereign but that it brings the organized
force ofthe state to the aid ofthose citizens
who believe in the !dw.
-Walter Lippmann
A Preface to Morals

I

n my last contribution to this column (HCR, July-August 2000), I argued that the law of bioethics has repeatedly failed to achieve the hopes
cherished for it. I presented evidence,
for example, that most doctors breach
the duty of informed consent, that advance directives do not direct patients'
care, and that repeated legal attempts to
increase organ donation have failed to
find the success predicted for them. I
closed that column by promising to try
to explain this chastening experience.
It would, of course, take a lifetime of
columns to capture all the reasons the
law of bioethics has so often disappointed. 1 Here I want to discuss only one, albeit a crucial one: Legal regulation of
human behavior is insistently difficult
because human behavior and social institutions are bafflingly complex. It is
maddeningly hard to mold that behavior and those institutions because they
are shaped by many potent forces besides the law and because lawmakers so
often cannot accurately identifY all those
forces and devise reliable methods of altering enough of them in sufficiently
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precise and predictable ways to achieve
the result intended. It is even hard for
law to rule in its own house-for example, to shape litigation in useful ways.
The law of bioethics illustrates both the
general problem (influencing social behavior) and its particular instantiation
(influencing legal institutions). Let me
once again adduce empirical evidence to
show how.
Living wills exemplifY the first problem. Living wills seemed an obvious solution to the perplexity of making end
of life decisions for incompetent patients, but they have betrayed the expectations faithfully nurtured for them. To
see why, consider the chain of circumstances necessary for living wills to be
well and widely used.
First, people must want a living will.
Some people say they do not, many of
them because they think satisfactory decisions will be made for them without
one. Many people believe they want a
living will, but very many of these have
not signed one even though they know
about advance directives. Programs to
persuade people to sign living wills have
not been conspicuously successful. Is
this, perhaps, because people do not actually want them, or do not actually
want them enough to overcome ambivalence about them?
Second, people must know what
treatment they would want should they
become incompetent. This requirement
has several components. To begin with,
people must (a) obtain accurate information about what their choices would
be and (b) understand that information.
But patients will encounter all the prob-

!ems acquiring and analyzing information that have become notorious
through studies of informed consent.
And empirical investigation suggests
that doctors are neither anxious to have
conversations about living wills nor
adept at conducting them. 2 Furthermore, unless people are assisted with exceptional care, they must decipher the
advance directive itself. This is no small
undertaking. Living wills are often execrably drafted. And even if they were
drafted by angels, "[i]n the largest study
of functional health literacy in the United States, . . . 42% of . . . [Englishspeaking patients] were unable to comprehend directions for taking medication on an empty stomach, 26% could
not understand information on an appointment slip, and 60% could not understand a standard consent form."3 In
addition, people preparing advance directives not only confront all the perplexities of medical decisions; they also
face the special problems of making decisions for a hypothetical future. They
must imagine what they would want at
an unspecifiable time stricken with an
unidentifiable illness with unpredictable
treatments.
People who have come this far must,
third, put their choices into words. This
riddle has received considerable, pained,
attention. The first generation of living
wills spoke in egregiously broad terms;
the second generation reacted with
heroic attempts at specificity; and the
third generation has essayed such devices as "values histories," recklessly
flouting Oliver Wendell Holmes's wise
warning that "general principles do not
decide concrete cases." My own experience is that patients cannot tell you
what their living wills actually say, and
more systematic students conclude, for
example, that their "observations raise
serious questions about the patient's understanding of the general statement in
the California directive and suggest that
such brief expressions cannot be taken as
exact instructions." 4
Fourth, the living wills patients write
must be available to the people making
the medical decisions. Ordinarily, this
means living wills must leave the
lawyer's or doctor's office, follow paHASTINGS CENTER REPORT
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tients in their pilgrimage through the
health care system, and enter patients'
charts in sufficiently obvious ways that
they are noticed. We thus find studies
reporting, for example, that in 74 percent of the admissions examined, "the
advance directive was not recognized,
nor was there written documentation of
any attempts to discern if an advance directive had been previously executed."5
Fifth, the people making decisions
for incompetent patients must comprehend and obey the living will's instructions. The challenges this requirement
presents are suggested by the study that
found that "[e]ven with the therapy-specific A[dvance] D[irective] accompanied
by designation of a proxy and prior patient-physician discussion, the proportion of physicians who were willing to
withhold therapies was quite variable." 6
Another study determined that "the existence of an advance directive that limits the therapeutic maneuvers to be carried out after the patient becomes unable to make his or her own healthcare
decisions do [sic] not influence the level
of medical care overall. "7 As another
study explained, there is "a complex interaction of the following three themes:
patients were not seen as 'absolutely,
hopelessly ill,' and thus, it was never
considered the time to invoke the AD;
the contents of ADs were vague and difficult to apply to current clinical situations; and family members or the surrogate designated in a [durable power of
attorney] were not available, were ineffectual, or were overwhelmed with their
own concerns and did not effectively advocate for the patient."B
In sum, failures confound every step
along the path toward a successful
regime of advance directives and show
how challenging it can be for the law to
affect behavior even in apparently simple and desirable ways. The similarly
perilous path to a law of informed consent with bite indicates that the law can
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hardly make even its own institutions
work as intended. The law gives doctors
an incentive to inform their patients
properly by offering patients a legal remedy-money damages-if physicians
fail in their duty. But observe again how
many steps lie between the injury and
the remedy. First, patients must realize
both that they have not been informed
as the law requires and that they have
legal recourse. Then they must decide to
sue. We may be a litigious society, but
even people who have actually been injured often decline to pursue legal remedies. For example, "only a small fraction
of persons with a valid [medical malpractice] claim actually file a suit."9
Having decided to sue, patients must
find a lawyer.
But this is the easy part. Lawyers ordinarily ask three questions: Did the
doctor's failure to inform the patient
cause some physical injury? Would the
ordinary patient have chosen a treatment differently if properly informed?
Was the injury great enough and is the
evidence dear enough to make it worth
my while litigating the case? To at least
one of these questions, the answer is
usually "no." Even if the answer to each
is "yes," patient and lawyer must persevere over the many years suits last. The
court must accurately evaluate the doctor's liability and the patient's damages.
Finally, doctors must extract the correct
lessons from the law's workings: they
must learn when information is required
and that withholding it exacts appropriately measured costs.
In short, the law of bioethics disappoints partly because it is truly difficult
to affect human behavior. Not only is
life elaborately complex. People's preferences and behavior are principally
shaped by the norms and institutions in
which they are embedded. The law can
wheel its cumbersome and rickety machinery into place only laboriously and
sporadically. Small wonder that law gen-

erally, and not just the law of bioethics,
repeatedly teaches us that "[t]he amount
of law is relatively small which a modern
legislature can successfully impose."
But I do not counsel despair. Law's
policies can be devised badly or well. In
a later column I will discuss some of the
reasons lawmakers seem so often to have
written the law of bioethics ineptly.
1. I have already described several reasons in
"Bioethics in the Language of the Law," Hastings Center Report 24, no. 4 (1994): 16-24.
There I argued that law and bioethics speak
different languages because law is a general system of social regulation that responds to many
imperatives beyond bioethical reason.
2. See, for example, J.A. Tulsky et a!.,
"Opening the Black Box: How Do Physicians
Communicate about Advance Directives?" Annals of Internal Medicine 129 (1998): 441-49,
at 444.
3. Ad Hoc Committee on Health Literacy
for the Council on Scientific Affairs, American
Medical Association, "Health Literacy: Repon
of the Council on Scientific Affairs," ]AMA
281 (1999): 552-53, at 553.
4. L.J. Schneiderman et a!, "Relationship of
General Advance Directive Instructions to Specific Life-Sustaining Treatment Preferences in
Patients With Serious Illness," Archives ofInternal Medicine 152 (1992): 2114-22, at2119.
5. R.S. Morrison eta!., 'The Inaccessibility
of Advance Directives on Transfer from Ambulatory to Acute Care Settings," ]AMA 274
(1995): 478-82, at 480.
6. W.R. Mower and L.J. Baraff, "Advance
Directives: Effect of Type of Directive on
Physicians' Therapeutic Decisions," Archives of
Internal Medicine 153 (1993): 375-81, at 378.
7. M.D. Goodman, M. Tarnoff, and G.J.
Slotman, "Effect of Advance Directives on the
Management of Elderly Critically Ill Patients,"
Critical Care Medicine 26 (1998): 701-704, at
703.
8. J.M. Teno et a!., "Role of Written Advance Directives in Decision Making: Insights
from Qualitative and Quantitative Data," journal of General Internal Medicine 13 (1998):
439-46, at 441.
9. FA. Sloan et a!, Suing for Medical Malpractice 1 (University of Chicago Press, 1993),
P· 1.
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